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Silvia M. Riechel*
I. INTRODUCTION
W ith the growing recognition of global environmental problems such
as climate change, acid rain, the loss of living species, and air and
ocean pollution, governments and their citizens are searching for more
ways to sustain and improve not only their environment but also the
environment of the entire planet.' We now know the wide-range effects
of environmental disasters such as nuclear accidents,2  oil spills,3 and
toxic waste.' Throughout the world, we have seen the destruction of the
rain forests and their living species,' the thinning of the ozone layer
and the disruption of the climate.6 "[E]nvironmental degradation is rare-
ly confined to specific geographic areas and can prove costly to all
nations, be it in the form of ocean dumping, deforestation, greenhouse
gases, or ozone depletion."7 Our civilization is now capable of affecting
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
See generally James J. Ferris, United Effort Can Produce a Decade of the Environment,
USA TODAY, Jan. 1992 (Magazine), at 66 (discussing how several environmental statutes may be
utilized in an united effort to restore the environment).
2 See, e.g., Joyce Bamathan & Steven Strasser, The Chernobyl Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, May
12, 1986, at 22 (detailing the April, 1986 nuclear accident at Chernobyl).
' See generally George J. Church, The Big Spill, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 38 (discussing the
Exxon Valdez oil spill).
" See generally AL GORE, THE EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIR-
rr 273 (1992) (discussing, among other things, the environmental complications of toxic waste);
Jerry Adler et al., Our Befouled Beaches: Condoms, Styrofoam and Germs Litter the Sea,
NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 50 (discussing the waste that has washed ashore on many of the
nation's beaches).
' See Harriet Shapiro, Destruction of Rain Forests, Warns a Conservationist, Is Endangering
Many Species - Including Our Own, PEOPLE WKLY., Nov. 28, 1988, at 165 (Dr. Russel
Mittermeier explains the destruction of the rain forests and the life within.).
6 See Richard E. Benedick, A Case of Deja Vu, SCI. AM., Apr. 1992, at 160 (discussing
the extent of ozone depletion and possible solutions).
"[Tihe [United States] is in surprisingly good shape environmentally, in comparison with its
past or with other nations." Landfills and Forests, FORBES, SepL 14, 1992, at 316, 316.
" Stanley M. Spracker & Ethan S. Naftalin, Applying Procedural Requirements of U.S. Envi-
ronmental Laws to Foreign Ventures: A Growing Challenge to Business, 25 INT'L LAW. 1043,
1052 (1991).
Such environmental threats are what Vice President Gore, in his book, calls "strategic"
threats because they affect the global ecological system. See GORE, supra note 4, at 29.
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the entire biosphere, and because of this new capability, our relationship
with the environment has been transformed.8 In our effort to compen-
sate for this transformation, we should recognize the critical importance
of environmental regulation and reexamine our environmental laws for
rationality and efficiency.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969' is among
the earliest efforts by the United States to implement effective environ-
mental regulation.'0  "The underlying substantive problem [to which
NEPA was addressed] was the apparent necessity for better maintenance
of the human environment, and especially of those natural systems that
undergird human life and various components of human well-being.""
By requiring all federal agencies to complete an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for every "major Federal action[] significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment[,]J 12 the United States has insti-
gated a plan to monitor and decrease the impacts that its actions would
have on the global environment. To the extent that NEPA has modified
how the federal government treats the environment and controls degrada-
tion, NEPA has proven to be a successful vehicle for environmental
protection. 3
In recent years, there has been a debate about how far NEPA
should reach in regard to governmental actions outside of the United
States. 4 Judicial decisions have looked for congressional intent in the
' GORE, supra note 4, at 30. Gore cites two key changes in our civilization that account
for the change in our relationship with the earth: the surge in human population, and the ac-
celeration of the scientific and technological revolution.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
"0 Many of the well known environmental statutes were enacted in the early 1970's, after
NEPA was enacted. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988 & Supp.
111 1991) (enacted in 1976); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. In 1991)
(enacted, in its present form, in 1972); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1992) (enacted,
in its present form, in 1972). "The federalizing of environmental law began with President Nixon
signing the National Environmental Policy Act . . . on national television on January 1, 1970."
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 109
(1992).
" RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 2
(1976).
12 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
3 Lynton K. Caldwell, NEPA Revisited: A Call for a Constitutional Amendment, ENVTL. F.,
Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 18, 18.
4 Scott C. Whitney, Should the National Environmental Policy Act Be Extended to Major
Federal Decisions Significantly Affecting the Environment of Sovereign Foreign States and the
Global Commons?, I VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 440 (1990). For other commentary on the extra-
territoriality of NEPA, see, e.g., Joan R. Goldfarb, Extraterritorial Compliance with NEPA Amid
the Current Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543 (1991); Mary A.
McDougall, Extraterritoriality and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 80 GEO. L.J. 435 (1991);
19941 EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NEPA 117
statute's language to apply NEPA extraterritorially, 5 and have found
either that there is no such intent 6 or that, despite possible congressio-
nal intent, foreign policy concerns demand that NEPA not be applied
outside the United States in those particular cases.'7
A study of the extraterritorial application of other U.S. statutes
reveals a distinct pattern: courts have not applied "nonmarket" ' statutes
such as NEPA and other environmental and labor laws extraterritorially
because of the lack of congressional intent or potential policy conflicts.
On the other hand, in interpreting "market" 9 statutes such as antitrust,
securities, and taxation laws, courts have had little difficulty in finding
the requisite congressional intent and favorable policy arguments.2" This
market/nonmarket distinction is indicative of the strong influence of
governmental interest in statutory interpretation. This Note asserts that
in following this distinction, courts have not only implemented bad envi-
ronmental policy in their decisionmaking, but they have also misread the
Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Federal Statutes, N.Y.
L.J., March 19, 1992, at 3; Spracker & Naftalin, supra note 7; David F. Zoll, It Already Has an
International Dimension, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 30; Gary M. Ernsdorff, Comment, The
Agency for International Development and NEPA: A Duty Unfulfilled, 67 WASH. L. REV. 133
(1992); Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Requirement,
74 MICH. L. REv. 349 (1975);
" See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (D.D.C.
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748
F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
16 See, e.g., 772 F. Supp. at 1297.
" See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647
F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
A recent D.C. Circuit Court opinion did apply NEPA to a federal action outside the United
States stating that NEPA raises no extraterritorial issues at all, but it limited this holding to
federal actions occurring only in Antarctica. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National
Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also infra notes 104-17 and accompa-
nying text.
1 "Nonmarket" statutes are those statutes not "primarily intended to protect market interests."
Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 601 (1990). E.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C.S. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). Labor laws are another example of
nonmarket statutes, but a few have been amended to extend their coverage extraterritorially. See
infra text accompanying notes 73-82 regarding Title VII, and the 1984 amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992). See
also Ryuichi Yamakawa, Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of Fair Employment Laws
After EEOC v. Aramco, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoMP. REG. 71 (1992).
19 See Turley, supra note 18, at 601; infra note 129 (discussing "market" statutes such as
the Federal Securities Exchange Act and the tax and bankruptcy codes).
' See infra part V.A.
2 Turley, supra note 18, at 637-38.
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statutory language of NEPA and misapplied the presumption against
extraterritoriality. NEPA must be applied to all federal actions regardless
of where they occur in order for the United States to maintain its contri-
bution to global environmental protection. Otherwise the United States is
effectively stating that American citizens are more worthy of protection
from environmental dangers than citizens of other nations. The environ-
ment cannot withstand this kind of governmental hypocrisy.
The first two sections of this Note will provide an introduction to
NEPA and the notion of extraterritoriality. Decisional law relating to the
extraterritorial application of NEPA will then be reviewed followed by
an analysis of the statute and the arguments for extraterritorial applica-
tion. This section includes a comparison of NEPA with other statutes
whose extraterritorial application has been debated and an examination
of the public policy concerns surrounding NEPA. Finally, the conclusion
will propose judicial and legislative reform.
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
The purpose of NEPA is
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich
the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources im-
portant to the Nation ... 22
The enactment of NEPA accompanied a growing awareness of domestic
and global environmental problems." The "heart" '24 of NEPA is the
environmental impact statement (EIS) which is provided for in §
4332.' An EIS must include the environmental impact of the activity,
- 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
'3 ORLANDO E. DELOGU, INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH THE PREPARATION AND ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 9 (1974).
14 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT § 1:01 (1984) ("The heart of NEPA is the environmental impact statement which
the statute requires on all major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.").
§ 4332 provides that
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall- . . . (C) include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Feder-
al actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement ["EIS"] by the responsible official on- . . . (iv) the rela-
tionship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
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adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided, alternatives, the
relationship between "uses of man's environment" and long term produc-
tivity, and "any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resourc-
es. ' The process of drafting an EIS is a time-consuming process.'
Several drafts are usually required2 and there must be at least a forty-
five day comment period.29 The final drafts are generally lengthy, usu-
ally fifty to one hundred pages long,3" and occasionally extra personnel
are hired specifically to write them.3' In addition to the time spent pre-
paring an EIS, further delay to an agency action may be caused by
administrative challenges and civil litigation.32
Much criticism has been leveled at NEPA and the EIS process
because of its tendency to generate litigation,33 the uncertainty about its
success in producing environmentally responsible decision-making by
agencies,' 4 the inadequacy of the science to support impact analyses,35
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity ....
42 U.S.C. § 4332
6 Id. at § 4332(C).
' For an example of an accounting of an EIS-drafting process, see Barbara-Ann G. Lewis,
Cost Indexing the Environment, THE SIERRA CLUB BULL., June-July 1975, reprinted in JACKSON
B. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENviRONmENTAL DECISIONMAKING AND NEPA 129 (1986).
See also ANDREWS. supra note 11, at 67, 137 (showing tables of the estimated man hours
required to prepare certain environmental impact statements: for example, 443 hours for non-
controversial projects and 1798 for controversial projects).
"' See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1992). See also Lewis, supra note 27, at 131-32.
40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (1992).
3'0 See MARTIN S. BAKER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A GUIDE TO
PREPARATION AND REvIEw 225-307 (1977) (providing the summary sheets and tables of contents
for eleven different EIS').
See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7 (1992) ("The text of final environmental impact state-
ments ...shall normally be less than 15Q pages and for proposals of unusual scope or com-
plexity shall normally be less than 300 pages."); PERCIVAL, supra note 10, at 1025 ("While
federal regulations provide that an EIS generally should not exceed 150 pages in length, many
are far longer the EIS on an offshore oil lease sale is likely to be several hundred pages, while
the EIS for licensing of a nuclear power plant may reach several thousand.").
3' Lewis, supra note 27, at 130.
32 JACKSON B. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENVIRONEMTNAL DECISIONMAKING AND
NEPA 113 (1986).
At first glance this requirement [§ 4332] may have seemed innocuous
enough; but it has bred the familiar - or notorious - environmental im-
pact statements now securely internalized in federal bureaucratic action, a
powerful weapon in the environmentalist's litigation arsenal, and the bane of
any industry desiring to expedite projects requiring federal approval.
Id. at 112.
' Caldwell, supra note 13, at 21.
3' PERCIVAL, supra note 10, at 1081; Caldwell, supra note 13, at 20.
3' Caldwell, supra note 13, at 20.
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and the ineffectiveness of the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ).36 Although NEPA may not have met all of the expectations of
its initial supporters, many agree that it has succeeded in producing
more environmentally-sensitive planning and in reducing government-
sponsored environmental damage.37 In response to the criticism, many
have proposed that the government could avoid the time and cost of
litigation by stopping environmentally destructive proposals at the agen-
cy level.38 Likewise, concern about federal agencies skewing scientific
data in the EIS to meet their political agendas is more appropriately
directed at the agencies and officials themselves and not at the Act that
they are implementing.39 Furthermore, scientific uncertainty is not
unique to environmental issues. The inadequacy of scientific data is an
obstacle that must be overcome in many fields such as agriculture, med-
icine, economics, and criminology.4" Criticism about the CEQ, however,
is more difficult to refute. The CEQ's advisory potential has not been
fully utilized and its recommendations have sometimes gone unheed-
ed.4' Most agree that more attention must be given to this executive
agency and the realization of its purported functions.42 Despite their
shortcomings, however, NEPA and the EIS requirement have proven to
be an "essential means to an important policy end: better planning and
decision making . .. ."'
NEPA requires that all federal agencies prepare an EIS for "every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."'  Among the problems with interpreting NEPA has been the
question of which federal actions are covered. Several federal agencies
have refused to acknowledge NEPA's application to their international
' Id. at 22. "[NEPA] has survived without strong and focused support from Congress, the
executive branch, or outside interests. Indeed, the Act has been buffeted with criticism - often
misinformed or misguided - from all sectors." Id. at 20. For more information about the CEQ,
see infra note 164.
37 See PERCIVAL, supra note 10, at 1084; Caldwell, supra note 13, at 22.
' Caldwell, supra note 13, at 21.
39 Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 20.
4' See id. at 22 ("The EIS alone cannot compel adherence to the principles of NEPA. The
EIS is necessary but insufficient as an action-forcing procedure; it has prevented ill-conceived
actions, but it cannot advance positive measures."). For more information on the CEQ, see infra
note 164.
42 See PERCIVAL, supra note 10, at 1083; Caldwell, supra note 13, at 22.
41 Caldwell, supra note 13, at 20. "In retrospect, the NEPA strategy appears to have been
the best and, indeed, has succeeded beyond the expectations of some of its authors." Id. at 22.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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activities." Although NEPA does not define the words "Federal ac-
tions", the term has been broadly defined by the courts to include feder-
al projects, state and local programs funded by federal assistance, private
development authorized by federal permits, and rulemaking and adjudi-
cation by federal agencies.46
It must also be noted that NEPA does not contain exemptions for
any federal activities. The EIS requirement "appl[ies] to all federal agen-
cies even though their legislation does not require the consideration of
environmental concerns."'47 The only exceptions are those allowed by
the Federal courts." In fact, NEPA provides that the Federal govern-
ment "use all practicable means" to fulfill the mandate of NEPA.4 9
There is no provision in NEPA expressly addressing the application
of NEPA outside the United States, and NEPA's legislative history pro-
vides no guidance.5 The language of NEPA, however, seems to indi-
cate that the EIS requirement should reach federal activities all over the
The following agencies have refused to acknowledge such an application: the Defense
Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Export-Import Bank
(Eximbank), and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Note, supra note 14, at
350.
46 MANDELKER, supra note 24, § 1:01. See also Note, supra note 14, at 358 ("The phrase
['agencies of the Federal Government'] is unqualified and its clear and natural meaning is that
every federal agency, regardless of the locus of its activities, was intended to be included.").
' MANDELKER, supra note 24, § 1:03.
4 id.
Among the exceptions to NEPA that have been recognized are critical military projects,
enforcement/pollution control agencies, executive responsibilities, and emergencies. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1506.11 (1992); DELOGU, supra note 23, at 31. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
National Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he government may avoid the
EIS requirement where U.S. foreign policy interests outweigh the benefits derived from preparing
an EIS."); Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957, 1959 (1979) (Exemptions are listed in
section 2-5.). These exceptions prevent any interference with necessary military defense measures.
It may be noted, however, that even these exceptions are against the policy of global environ-
mental protection.
49 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). See MANDELKER, supra note 24, at § 5:06 ("NEPA does not ex-
empt any federal agency from its requirements, and indeed provides that they shall comply 'to
the fullest extent possible. ). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(f) (1992); infra note 166 and
accompanying text.
' See, e.g., S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (the Senate bill for NEPA); H.R. 12549,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (the House bill for NEPA); 115 CONG. REc. 19,008-13 (1969)
(Senate adopts its version of the bill); 115 CONG. REc. 26,568-91 (1969) (House adopts its ver-
sion of the bill). For an extensive review of NEPA's legislative history, see Note, supra note 14,
at 365-71 (concluding that "although the legislative history is not conclusive evidence of con-
gressional intention to apply [the EIS section] extraterritorially, it does demonstrate clearly that
Congress was concerned with the environmental problem on a worldwide as well as on a
national scale.").
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world.5 Much of the language in NEPA relates to the global environ-
ment and global relations. For example, in § 4321, the "Congressional
declaration of purpose[,]" refers to "harmony between man and his envi-
ronment" and the "health and welfare of man." Section 4331, "Congres-
sional declaration of national environmental policy," refers specifically to
the "general welfare" and "restoring and maintaining environmental qual-
ity to the overall welfare and development of man[,]" and its general
tone indicates concern for the global environment.52 Finally, § 4332
refers to the "human environment" and "man's environment" and states
that
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall .. .(F) recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and,
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to
maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a
decline in the quality of mankind's world environment ......
This language expresses congressional intent to consider global environ-
mental effects when implementing NEPA, and governmental concern for
all those affected by environmental impacts of federal actions. "NEPA's
purpose does not lie in the preservation of the peace and order for a
particular community. NEPA does not purport to protect only the United
States's environment and biosphere; the statute's purposes transcend
territorial boundaries."
"' Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 553.
52
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological ad-
vances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and main-
taining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in coop-
eration with State and local governments, and other concerned public and
private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and pro-
mote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
" Id. § 4332. For an extensive discussion about the interpretation of "human environment"
and "man's environment," see Note, supra note 14, at 360-65 (concluding "that Congress sought
not only to attain acceptable environmental quality in the United States, but also to minimize the
degradation of the worldwide environment resulting from federal activities abroad[]").
' Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 593.
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III. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The continuing debate about whether NEPA's requirements should
apply to activities occurring outside the United States is tantamount to
the issue of whether to apply NEPA extraterritorialy. Extraterritoriality
is defined as the application of laws beyond the limits of the enacting
state. 5 "[t is essentially a jurisdictional concept concerning the author-
ity of a nation to adjudicate the rights of particular parties, to establish
the norms of conduct applicable to events or persons outside its borders,
or to exercise power to compel conduct."56
The first case to deal with the extraterritorial application of a U.S.
statute was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.5" In this case,
the defendant, an Alabama banana-growing corporation, incited the sei-
zure of the plaintiff's banana plantation in Costa Rica by the Costa
Rican government. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant under
the Sherman Antitrust Act which protects trade from monopolies. Recog-
nizing that the defendant's action was done outside the jurisdiction of
the United States, the court stated that the "universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done."58 If the United States
were to deem an act done outside its borders illegal, it would be inter-
fering with the sovereignty of another nation.59 Such considerations
"lead in a case of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to
be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."' Therefore, the
court interpreted the Sherman Act to apply only to those subject to
United States legislation, and held the anti-competitive acts of the de-
fendant done in Costa Rica, where they were legal, outside U.S. juris-
diction.
The presumption against extraterritoriality as it presently exists
operates whenever a showing of congressional intent to regulate abroad
is absent. This standard was established in Foley Bros. v. Filardo.6'
This case was brought by an American citizen working for an American
contractor on a construction project in Iran and Iraq under a contract
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
6 McDougall, supra note 14, at 445. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National
Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
id. at 356.
6 Id. at 357.
" 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
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with the United States. The plaintiff claimed a violation of the Eight
Hour Law6' which fixed maximum workdays and applied to "[e]very
contract made to which the United States . . . is a party ... ."' The
court stated that the question to be answered in this case was not
whether Congress has the power to extend the law to actions in foreign
countries, which was the issue addressed in American Banana, but
whether Congress intended to do this.' The court reasoned that Con-
gress meant to apply a statute within its territorial jurisdiction unless a
contrary intent is evident.65 This is based on the assumption that Con-
gress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. In this case, the
court found no intent to apply the Eight Hour Law to work performed
in foreign countries, and concluded that the word "every" in "[elvery
contract made to which the United States ... is a party . . . " was
inserted only to clarify the application of the law to private property
within the United States.'
The presumption against extraterritoriality was later clarified in
United States v. Mitchell7 which reversed the conviction of an
American citizen for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA)68 by capturing dolphins within the three mile limit of the
Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The court held that the criminal prohi-
bitions of the Act do not reach the territorial waters of foreign states.69
In so holding, the court recognized that Congress does have the power
to control the conduct of American citizens overseas because "citizen-
ship alone is generally recognized as a relationship sufficient to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by a state."7 The question therefore is not
congressional authority but congressional intent, and until such intent is
shown to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, no statute
should be applied outside the United States.71 To negate any intent to
apply the Marine Mammal Protection Act extraterritorially, the court
cited its statutory construction, legislative history and other surrounding
circumstances, specifically pointing out that the MMPA is based upon
the control that sovereigns such as the United States have on natural
40 U.S.C. §§ 324-326 (1988) (repealed 1962).
Id. § 324.
64 336 U.S. at 284-85.
65 Id.
6 Id. at 287.
67 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
9 553 F.2d at 997.
G Id. at 1001.
"' Id. at 1002.
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resources within their territories.72
It must be noted, however, that judicial denials of extraterritorial
application do not always endure. In 1991, the Supreme Court denied
extraterritorial application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964'3 in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco)4 Title VII
prohibits discriminatory practices based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. Despite the broad language of Title VII regarding its
application to an employer if it is engaged in an "industry affecting
commerce[,]" '75 the expansive definitions of commerce "between a State
and any place outside thereof[,]" 76 and the EEOC's position that Title
VII did apply abroad, the court refused to grant extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, instead adhering to the presumption against extraterritoriality."
While acknowledging that the arguments are "plausible," the court held
that they were not sufficient evidence of a clearly expressed congres-
sional intent.7" The Court recognized that "Congress has the authority
to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States[,]"" but whether or not this authority has been exercised is a
matter of statutory construction and congressional intent to apply the
statute outside the United States." In response to the Court's deci-
sion,8" a bill to extend the geographical coverage of Title VII was in-
troduced in Congress and enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.2 The definition of employee now includes the statement, "[w]ith
respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an indi-
vidual who is a citizen of the United States." 3 Although the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality is deeply rooted in our legal system, this
legislative reversal of Aramco demonstrates that the government is capa-
ble of adapting to further the best interests of its citizens.
7 Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
74 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (The plaintiff was working for Aramco, a Delaware corporation,
at its principal place of business in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.).
s 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).
76 Id. at § 2000e(g).
111 S. Ct. at 1231.
73 Id.
" Id. at 1230.
a Id.
", One of the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "to respond to recent decisions
of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991). See also Yamakawa, supra note 18, at 112.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Id. at § 2000e(f).
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IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF NEPA
Deliberation over the extraterritorial application of NEPA began
shortly after NEPA was enacted. Interestingly, the first cases to examine
the reach of this statute assumed that it applied extraterritorially.' For
example, in People of Enewetak v. Laird85 the court granted an injunc-
tion of the Pacific Cratering Experiments on Enewetak Atoll until an
EIS was prepared stating simply that "NEPA is framed in expansive
language that clearly evidences a concern for all persons subject to
federal action which has a major impact on their environment - not
merely United States' citizens located in the fifty states."86 In Sierra
Club v. Adams87 in 1978, the court concluded that an EIS was appro-
priate for United States participation in the construction of a highway in
Panama and Columbia. The court stated in a footnote that it assumed
NEPA applied to this action because the government brief stated that it
never questioned its application to this case.8 Following this case, the
court in National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) v. United States Department of State 9 stated that
in view of defendants' willingness to prepare an "environmental analy-
sis" of the Mexican effects of United States support of that nation's
narcotics eradication program, together with the EIS required by NEPA
as to the impact of that program upon the United States, the court
need not reach the issue and need only assume without deciding, that
NEPA is fully applicable to the Mexican herbicide spraying pro-
gram °
Among the first decisions denying NEPA extraterritorial application
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d
1345, 1367 n.120 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 559. See also supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
8s 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973).
Id. at 816. See also People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp.
645, 650 (D. Haw. 1973) (dismissing the action for an injunction of the construction and opera-
tion of a hotel on public land in Saipan until an EIS was completed because it was not a
federal action) which cited Enewetak while stating that NEPA applies to all areas under United
States control, no matter where those areas are located, and therefore, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is not an issue.
578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
'8 Id. at 391-92 n.14.
452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id. at 1233. The court did not enjoin United States participation in the herbicide spraying
until an EIS was completed, however, because it concluded that the public interest in preventing
the importation of marijuana outweighed the necessity for prior EIS and that the political aspects
of this situation require the court to defer to the other governmental branches. Id. at 1234.
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was that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Babcock &
Wilcox.9 In finding that an EIS did not need to be completed before
issuing a license to sell nuclear reactor components to West Germany,
the Commission stated that § 4332(2)(F) regarding the recognition of
worldwide environmental problems only signifies the need for interna-
tional cooperation and not the application of NEPA outside of the Unit-
ed States.92
This idea was considered more extensively in Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1981. 93 In
this case, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) authorization of the exportation
of a nuclear reactor and other nuclear material to the Philippines, assert-
ing that an EIS is required for this action. The D.C. Circuit disagreed.
Like the court in Babcock, the D.C. Circuit concluded that NEPA was
primarily concerned with international cooperation instead of unilateral
environmental protection through its application,' but the court added a
qualification: "I find only that NEPA does not apply to NRC nuclear
export licensing decisions - and not necessarily that the EIS requirement
is inapplicable to some other kind of major federal action abroad."95
Thus, the court did not preclude the extraterritorial application of NEPA
in all situations, but only with respect to these facts.
In 1990, the District Court of Hawaii also refused to apply NEPA
outside U.S. boundaries in Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone.96 This case in-
volved an effort by environmental groups to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting the transportation of chemical munitions from Germany
to the Johnson Atoll in the central Pacific until the Army completed
satisfactory EIS' in compliance with NEPA. The court considered the
presumption against extraterritoriality,97 the plain language of NEPA,98
and foreign policy implications." Although the court stated that it be-
lieves that Congress intended to encourage the consideration of the
global impact of domestic actions by federal agencies and "may have
intended under certain circumstances for NEPA to apply
9' 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977).
92 Id. at 1338-39.
9 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
14 Id. at 1366.
9 Id.
748 F. Supp. 749.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 759.
99 Id.
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extraterritorially[,] ' ' °° the court held that the application of NEPA to
actions outside the United States would cause foreign policy conflicts
and interfere with the decisionmaking functions of the United States and
foreign sovereigns.' Again, however, the court limited its decision to
these facts. 2
By the time this case reached the Ninth Circuit, the issue was moot
because the transfer of the munitions had already occurred. 3 Again,
the door was left open for the application of NEPA to activities outside
the United States.
The most recent case to consider the extraterritorial application of
NEPA is Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National Science Founda-
tion"° involving the Environmental Defense Fund's (EDF) attempt to
enjoin the National Science Foundation (NSF) from incinerating food
wastes in Antarctica until an EIS was completed. The lower court had
relied upon the presumption against extraterritoriality in finding that
NEPA would not apply beyond United States borders. The district
court examined the language of the statute and concluded that although
Congress used broad language in NEPA's statement of purpose, there is
no plain expression of congressional intention to apply NEPA
extraterritorially.'" Curiously, the court mentioned that if it did have
jurisdiction over this matter, that is, if NEPA did apply extraterritorially,
it would not have allowed the NSF to get away with this activity so
easily. 7
100 Id.
101 Id. at 761.
102
The court must emphasize that this decision is limited to the specific and
unique facts which are presented here. In other circumstances, NEPA may
require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for action taken abroad, espe-
cially where United States agency's action abroad has direct environmental
impacts within this country, or where there has clearly been a total lack of
environmental assessment by the federal agency or foreign country involved.
Id.
103 Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991), dismissing as moot, 748 F.
Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
"4 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
05 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296. 1297 (D.D.C. 1991)
(The court proclaimed itself the first to directly address NEPA's extraterritorial application.),
rev'd on other grounds, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
'06 Id. at 1297.
-07 Id. at 1298 ("While the Court is compelled to conclude that NEPA does not apply
extraterritorially . . . the Court is concerned with the manner in which NSF undertook the
Environmental Impact Statement and had the Court had subject matter jurisdiction under ...
NEPA . . . the outcome in the present action may have been different.").
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The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the district court holding
that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes
described in Aramco does not apply where the conduct regulated by
the statute occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States,
and the alleged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be felt in Ant-
arctica-a continent without a sovereign, and an area over which the
United States has a great measure of legislative control."8
The Circuit Court stated that the district court erred when it failed to
consider "the threshold question of whether the application of NEPA to
agency actions in Antarctica presents an extraterritorial problem at
all."' The court emphasized the procedural nature of NEPA and its
effect of creating a process by which agency officials in the United
States can consider environmental consequences of their decisionmak-
ing." This decisionmaking is a uniquely domestic function."' The
court also noted the broad language of NEPA"' and the absence of
any foreign policy conflicts."'
The Circuit Court stressed the unique status of Antarctica as a
global commons."4 The court stated that even if the presumption
against extraterritoriality did apply, its force would be weakened since
its purpose in preventing conflict with the laws of other nations is void
in situations where there is no law with which to conflict."' The im-
portance of this point was accentuated by the court's assertion that it
does not decide how NEPA may apply to cases involving actual foreign
sovereigns unlike Antarctica." 6
Although the D.C. Circuit Court took a step in the right direction
10 986 F.2d at 529 (the case was remanded to the district court for a determination of
whether the EIS completed by the NSF was adequate).
'1 Id. at 532.
12 Id. ("NEPA is designed to control the decisionmaking process of U.S. federal agencies,
not the substance of agency decisions.").
', Id. at 536.
222 lit ("[NEPA] is clearly not limited to actions of federal agencies that have significant
environmental effects within U.S. borders. This Court has repeatedly taken note of the sweeping
scope of NEPA and the EIS requirement.").
123 Id. at 535 ("Since NEPA imposes no substantive requirements, U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests in Antarctica will rarely be threatened, except perhaps where the time required to prepare an
EIS would itself threaten international cooperation ... or where the foreign policy interests at
stake are particularly unique and delicate." (citations omitted)).
I d. at 533-34.
22 Id. at 533.
..6 Id. at 537.
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in holding NEPA applicable to federal actions in Antarctica, it did not
go far enough. Although most have recognized that Antarctica is a glob-
al commons, few seem to have recognized that it is certainly not the
only one. Our air, water, and atmosphere are global commons as well
and should therefore be considered through the NEPA process before
any federal action takes place. By holding that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is not raised by the application of NEPA to activities
in a global commons, the court was able to reach an environmentally
sound result that was clearly warranted in this circumstance. This depar-
ture from the presumption against extraterritoriality is a possible solution
to the unsettling trend of environmental degradation."7
V. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NEPA
Although the courts could infer extraterritoriality from statutory
language, it would be easier if Congress expressly stated whether or not
a statute should apply outside the United States. Unfortunately, Congress
does not always have the foresight when it writes the nation's laws to
predict the importance of the inclusion or exclusion of such simple
statements. On the other hand, an examination of different groups of
statutes suggests that Congress does, at times, have the foresight because
it has clearly proclaimed extraterritorial application when such applica-
tion furthers its interest and left the language ambiguous when extraterri-
torial application would hinder its interests."' This is the theory under-
lying the market/nonmarket distinction discussed in Part V.A.
There are many arguments in favor of the abandonment of this
distinction and against the denial of extraterritorial application of NEPA.
First, there is no legal integrity in the market/nonmarket distinction.' 9
No clear test is consistently used in extraterritoriality cases and the
courts are hindering the diplomatic relations of the United States by
allowing the government to cater to its self-serving motivations.
Second, even if the courts were to continue using the congressional
intent test that they currently use for environmental statutes like NEPA,
the language of NEPA calls for global environmental protection. 2' The
statute evinces a congressional purpose to consider the environmental
effects of all federal actions regardless of their locations. This apparent
purpose coupled with executive interpretations 2' favoring extraterritori-
... It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of the extraterritori-
al application of NEPA.
"' See infra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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al application of NEPA supports a finding of corresponding congressio-
nal intent, explained further in Part V.B.
Finally, Part V.C. will illustrate that the extraterritorial application
of NEPA is a good environmental policy because it (at least) gives the
impression of being concerned about the environmental welfare of peo-
ple outside the United States, it does not interfere with the laws of other
sovereigns, and exemptions are available for exceptional situations."
A. The Market-Nonmarket Distinction
NEPA is among several environmental statutes that are not uniform-
ly applied extraterritorially. An examination of U.S. statutes reveals that
"nonmarket" statutes," including environmental statutes like NEPA,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 24 and the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act"= are not applied extraterritorially because
of a lack of "clearly expressed intent."'26 For example, in United
States v. Mitchell27 the court denied extraterritorial application of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act because it could not find clear congres-
sional intent to apply the statute outside the United States. In so hold-
ing, the court did not consider the general purpose of the statute, to
protect marine mammals, and how this purpose would be furthered by
extraterritorial application in this case.
"Market" statutes," on the other hand, such as antitrust and secu-
rities laws, 29 are applied extraterritorially by less stringent territorial
', See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
, See supra note 18.
,24 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. See, e.g., Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) in which the court denied extraterritorial application of the RCRA where an
American corporation supplied hazardous substances to a British corporation and stored them at
the British facility. The court found that there was no congressional intent and no evidence in
the legislative history supporting extraterritorial application.
1- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir.
1977). Other environmental statutes not applied extraterritorially include the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1988), and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
- See 553 F.2d at 1002.
'z 553 F.2d 996.
1 See supra note 18.
129 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The bankruptcy and taxation codes are also market statutes which are applied
extraterritorially, but they contain express language calling for this application. In the tax code,
see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1988) ("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source de-
rived .... ); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1B (1993) (U.S. citizens are liable for tax from whatever source
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standards. Antitrust and securities laws are among the clearest examples
of market statutes. Antitrust laws were the first to be applied outside the
United States.3 ° As the world marketplace grew, the courts expanded
their interpretations of these laws to encompass the business and politics
of international trade.' Among the extraterritoriality tests used for an-
titrust and securities statutes is the "effects" or "intended effects" test,
which "permit[s] [extraterritorial application] whenever an actual or pre-
sumed anticompetitive effect on American markets [can] be shown"'3 2
or when "fraudulent foreign acts have domestic effects."'33 Another test
used in the interpretation of antitrust laws is the "conflicts test" which
considers the activity's effect on the foreign commerce of the U.S.,
whether there has been a cognizable violation of the statute at issue, and
whether international comity and fairness support extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. law.'34 A third test used primarily for securities statutes is
the "conduct test" which considers whether conduct in the United States
facilitates action outside the United States.'35 These activities may have
derived.); 26 C.F.R. § 1.11-1 (1993) (Domestic corporations are taxed on worldwide income.). In
the bankruptcy code, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (A person may be a debtor if he "re-
sides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States[;]" aliens and
foreign corporations in the United States may be adjudged bankrupt in voluntary or involuntary
proceedings.); 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1988) (Involuntary cases may be commenced by a foreign
representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding.); 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (Supp. IV 1992) (de-
fining a foreign proceeding as a judicial or administrative proceedings where the debtor is in a
foreign country).
'3 See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) where the court sus-
tained antitrust charges against American companies for a conspiracy to monopolize Mexican
sisal exports.
'3' Turley, supra note 18, at 609.
"~ Id. at 611. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945) where the court applied the Sherman Act extraterritorially to cover ALCOA's at-
tempted monopoly of aluminum ingot because of its effect on the American marketplace.
"Although American Banana [holding that the Sherman Act did not apply extraterritorially]
has never been formally overruled, the Supreme Court quickly saw the impossible limitations that
[its] original rule would place on the United States." Turley, supra note 18, at 609 (discussing
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)).
See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 531
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he presumption is generally not applied where the failure to extend the
scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the United States.
Two prime examples of this exception are the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976),
and the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1976), which have both been
applied extraterritorially where the failure to extend the statute's reach would have negative eco-
nomic consequences within the United States.").
"3 Turley, supra note 18, at 615.
" Id. at 612. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976) (sustaining a Sherman Act challenge to an alleged conspiracy to monopolize the milling of
Honduran lumber based on the considerations listed above).
"' Turley, supra note 18, at 615-16. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
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very little effect within the United States.' 36 "[T]hese tests largely pre-
suppose that the [statutes] can apply abroad and primarily consider
whether extraterritorial application is justified in the particular case."' 137
Thus, the courts do not adhere to strict statutory construction in these
cases, but instead examine them on a case-by-case basis 3' and consid-
er implied congressional purpose and policy. 139 Such an analysis prac-
tically assures a finding of extraterritoriality."4
Another class of statutes that are applied extraterritorially include
such laws as the Federal Child Pornography Statute 4' and U.S. drug
laws, such as the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).' 42
Yet another test, apparently related to the subject matter of the laws,
seems to be utilized in the consideration of the application of these stat-
utes. Although they are not clearly market or nonmarket statutes, they
do involve similar policy considerations. Drugs and pornography may
have market effects and courts do seem to engage in outcome determi-
native analyses, but their primary consideration appears to be the nature
of these heinous offenses. 43 The United States, therefore, has no
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) involving a claim under the Securities Exchange Act
regarding stock neither listed nor sold in the United States. The court upheld the claim on the
ground that action in the United States expedited the sale of the stock in the United Kingdom.
Id. at 1335.
See also 986 F.2d at 531 ("IT]he presumption against extraterritoriality is not applicable
when the conduct regulated by the government occurs within the United States. By definition, an
extraterritorial application of a statute involves the regulation of conduct beyond U.S. borders.
Even where the significant effects of the regulated conduct are felt outside U.S. borders, the
statute itself does not present a problem of extraterritoriality, so long as the conduct which
Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the United States."). Note that decisionmaking
regarding NEPA occurs largely within the United States. See infra note 179.
t Turley, supra note 18, at 616.
' Id. at 617.
132 Id. at 637.
139 Robert A. Kellan, Case Comment, Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Anti-Fraud Provisions
of the Federal Securities Laws, 15 STIFF. TRANSNAT'L LJ. 420, 428 (1991) (The "trend of the
courts [is] to focus on the intent and purpose behind the federal securities laws in order to
properly consider the issue of jurisdiction.").
" Turley, supra note 18, at 634.
141 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066,
1068 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the Act applies to Thomas' acts in Mexico despite the ab-
sence of a provision for extraterritorial application, because the exercise of extraterritorial power
may be inferred from the nature of the act and Congress' efforts to eradicate such crimes).
"4' 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1904 (West Supp. 1993). See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991) (sustaining a conviction for the possession
of marijuana seized one hundred miles off the coast of the United States, finding that the
MDLEA's extraterritoriality provision does not violate due process).
"4 Sandra W. Magliozzi, Case Comment, Federal Child Pornography Statute Applies to
Extraterritorial Acts, United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990), 14 SuFF.
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choice but to enforce the act to save its domestic and international repu-
tation.' Whichever test the courts are using, they are not relying on
clear congressional intent, but rather on an inference of congressional
intent from policy considerations. 45 While the courts are ostensibly
using an established method of statutory construction in the interpreta-
tion of U.S. laws, they are actually applying outcome-determinative tests
with clearly disparate results.
4 6
In summary, nonmarket environmental and employment statutes, in
contrast to the market, drug, and pornography statutes, have normal-
ly47 been interpreted using the "clearly expressed intent" standard.'48
The territorial analysis of the market statutes is conspicuously absent'49
and the presumption against extraterritoriality has become essentially
irrebuttable 50 There is no basis for such a clear distinction and no
legal integrity in its perpetuation.
Characteristics of market statutes that have allowed extraterritorial
application are also present in nonmarket statutes. It follows that market
tests could be used on nonmarket statutes. Both market and nonmarket
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 605, 610-11 (1991).
"' If the courts are using a public policy test in these cases, there is no reason that this test
should not also be applied to environmental statutes to benefit the environment. Just as there are
policies against drugs and pornography, there is a policy against environmental degradation. The
nature of each of these offenses is so destructive as to warrant special protection from our
courts. Environmental policy is discussed infra part V.C.
" See Magliozzi, supra note 143, at 612 (congressional intent is inferred from the nature of
the offense and other legislative acts).
'4 Turley, supra note 18, at 638.
" The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993), is
somewhat of an anomaly because it is an environmental statute that at one time was applied
extraterritorially. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd 112 S.
Ct. 2130 (1992), an environmental group challenged a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior in 1986 that limited the applicability of the Act's consultation provision to agency
actions "in the United States or upon the high seas." Id. at 118. The consultation provision re-
quires agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that their projects do not
jeopardize endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The Eighth Circuit held that the reglation
was invalid and the statute is applicable outside the United States. This decision was only a
"short-lived breakthrough[,]" however, because it was reversed by the Supreme Court in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Wendy S. Albers, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Closing the Courtroom Door to Environmental Plaintiffs - The Endangered Species Act Remains
Confined to United States Borders, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 203, 203 (1992). This
reversal left the regulation intact so that now the Endangered Species Act does not reach agency
actions in foreign countries. Id. at 204. For a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's decision,
see id. .
"' Turley, supra note 18, at 634.
149 Id. at 617.
0 Id. at 623.
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statutes have substantial territorial effects.' For example, global envi-
ronmental problems may intensify without the extraterritorial application
of environmental statutes.'52 It is also true that nonmarket statutes are
as unintrusive, if not less intrusive, than market statutes: 53 environ-
mental statutes regulate only Federal actions." NEPA, in particular, is
a procedural statute and therefore does not affect the substantive laws of
other countries. 55
Finally, the consideration of governmental interests in market and
nonmarket cases is clearly askew. There is a clear judicial bias in favor
of market interests.'56  For the most part, statutes applied
extraterritorially earn or at least save the United States money.'57 It is
true that the application of environmental statutes increases the cost of
doing business overseas,'58 but this is a necessary and relatively minute
cost to pay for environmental protection. The courts have not recognized
impending environmental dangers and concerns, thereby exposing gov-
ernmental hypocrisy and injuring diplomatic relations between the United
States and the countries whose environments it is exploiting. The gov-
ernment should not be allowed to cater only to "altruistic and self-serv-
ing motivations"'5 9 when determining extraterritorial applications.'"
"' Id. at 639-40.
11 Id. at 640-43.
3 Id. at 647-48. E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 ("laws of the United States . . . and (2) all agen-
cies of the Federal Government . . . ").
"4 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Iss See Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 757 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed
as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991) ("NEPA is essentially a procedural statute"); Note, supra
note 14, at 353.
6 Turley, supra note 18, at 651.
" E.g., the securities, antitrust, tax, and bankruptcy laws, supra note 129.
'5' NEPA's EIS requirement increases the cost of every project because the preparation of an
EIS takes time, effort, and may produce delays. For an example of the effort required to com-
plete an EIS, see ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 67, 137; Lewis, supra note 27.
59 Spmcker & Naftalin, supra note 7, at 1051.
" For example, Vice President Gore cites the U.S. economic system's favoritism of
quantifiable assets as "the single most powerful force behind what seem to be irrational decisions
about the global environment." GORE, supra note 4, at 182-83. Moreover,
[t]he bad things economists want to ignore while they measure the good
things are often said to be too difficult to integrate into their calculations.
After all, the bad things usually cannot be sold to anyone, and the responsi-
bility for dealing with their consequences can often be quietly pushed on to
someone else. Therefore, since the effort to keep track of the bad things
would complicate the valuation of the good things, the bad things are simply
defined away as external the process and called externalities.
Id. at 188-89. An example of this "external" treatment of the environment is in calculating a
country's GNP. For example, a country includes in its GNP the amount it receives on the sale
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Of course this issue could be viewed from a different perspective:
in the long term, environmental regulations may be beneficial to the
economy. Consideration of the environmental impacts of an action will
help the United States, as well as the foreign country in which the
action is taking place, to maximize the environmental benefits of the
project. 6' Additionally, consideration of the environment now will de-
crease the expense of cleaning up unnecessary waste later. Congressional
concerns expanded with the marketplace, and now they must develop
with the unifying environment. 62
B. NEPA and Global Environmental Protection
It is a plausible argument that the distinction between market and
nonmarket statutes cannot be eliminated because of erroneously en-
trenched custom in judicial practice or because of administrative difficul-
ties. Even if this were true, however, there are still arguments that
NEPA must be applied extraterritorially because of the gravity of its
subject matter. The acute importance of the environment warrants every
effort at conservation. This concern for global environmental protection
is evident in the purpose and language of NEPA: for example, NEPA
calls for the recognition of the "worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems" and the support of programs to "prevent[] a
decline in the quality of mankind's world environment."'63
The importance of the environment is also recognized by executive
interpretations of NEPA. The most significant of these interpretations is
that of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). The CEQ was
established in § 4342 of NEPA "to appraise programs and activities of
the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in subchapter
I of this chapter ... and to formulate and recommend national policies
to promote the improvement of the quality of the environment."'6 The
of timber from its rain forests, but excludes a measurement for the depletion of its natural re-
sources. Id. at 337-38.
6 Note, supra note 14, at 378
Considering the effort and expense involved in many of the federal activities
abroad, it is only reasonable to provide both the federal agency and the
foreign nation involved with the opportunity to maximize the over-all bene-
fits of a proposed project by facilitating their consideration of environmental
as well as economic and technical factors in the decision-making process.
Id.
I162 Turley, supra note 18, at 664.
'6' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F). See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
164 42 U.S.C. § 4342. Title II creates the CEQ in the Executive Office of the President as
the principle agency responsible for the administration of NEPA. The CEQ is located in Wash-
ington, D.C. and its responsibilities include the review and evaluation of federal programs and
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CEQ has stated that federal agencies must "to the fullest extent possi-
ble: . . . [u]se the NEPA process to identify and assess the reasonable
alternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize adverse
effects of these actions upon the quality of the human environment." 65
Additionally, the CEQ requires federal agencies to "[u]se all practicable
means consistent with the requirements of the Act and other essential
considerations of national policy, to restore and enhance the quality of
the human environment and avoid or minimize possible adverse effects
of their actions upon the quality of the human environment."'" The
CEQ interprets "human environment" in a comprehensive manner to
include the natural and physical environment and its relationship to the
people within it.167 Although the interpretation of the agency that is
responsible for a statute's enforcement is entitled to substantial deference
by courts and other branches of the government, 6 ' the CEQ's proc-
lamation appears to have been disregarded by courts analyzing NEPA.
the annual production of environmental quality reports. MANDELKER, supra note 24, §§ 2:08-09.
The CEQ promulgates interpretive regulations, found at 40 C.F.R., that bind all federal
agencies. "These regulations, which reflect much of the case law that had developed under the
statute, are the first recourse for analysis of any NEPA problem. They spell out many of the
details of the NEPA process, and they receive considerable deference from the courts."
PERCIVAL, supra note 10, at 1025. As explained in this section, the courts have not deferred to
the CEQ's interpretation of NEPA in regard to its extraterritorial application.
"u 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(e) (1992).
l5 Id. § 1500.2(0.
' Id. § 1508.14.
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations
has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to
the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy
in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowl-
edge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations ....
. . . If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflict-
ing policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute,
we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legis-
lative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961) (citations omitted)). See also
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 536 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("[The] CEQ is the agency created by Congress to oversee the implementation of NEPA,
and its interpretation of that statute is generally entitled to 'substantial deference."'). Cf. Goldfarb,
supra note 14, at 564 (regarding interpretations of the Department of State).
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The CEQ clearly supports the extraterritorial application of NEPA, 69
and the courts should defer to its judgment.
Another executive interpretation of NEPA emphasizing the impor-
tance of the global environment is Executive Order 12114 issued by
President Jimmy Carter in 1979, ten years after NEPA went into effect.
The objective of this Executive Order was to "further the purpose of the
National Environmental Policy Act, with respect to the environment
outside the United States, its territories and possessions."' 7 This Exec-
utive Order emphasizes the importance of the global environment and
the United States' contribution to its protection by including a broad
range of federal actions within the scope of NEPA. 17' These interpreta-
tions must be considered by the courts when determining the extraterri-
toriality of NEPA.
C. Environmental Policy
The world is now faced with "global problems such as climate
change, ozone depletion, acid rain, ocean pollution and protection of
living resources. These problems are quintessentially global in na-
ture."' 2 It has also been noted that "[e]nvironmental disasters have be-
come the norm rather than the exception in world news today. Contami-
nation from toxic waste, deforestation, oil spills, and other disasters have
captured world attention in recent years as have the underlying causes:
accidents, resource mismanagement, and most recently, environmental
69 For a review of additional CEQ action on this topic, see Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 571-
73.
170 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979).
17 Actions included in this Executive Order are
(a) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of the glob-
al commons outside the jurisdiction of any nation . . . (b) major Federal
actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation not partici-
pating with the United States and not otherwise involved in the action; (c)
major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign
nation which provide to that nation .. . [a product that produces another
product or emission that is prohibited or regulated by the U.S.]; (d) major
Federal actions outside the United States, its territories and possessions
which significantly affect natural or ecological resources of global impor-
tance . ...
44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979).
The district court in Massey noted that the Order does not create a cause of action. Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 566; Whit-
ney, supra note 14, at 446.
" Whitney, supra note 14, at 470.
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terrorism.""' NEPA is among the most effective ways the U.S. gov-
ernment can monitor and control its impact on the global environ-
ment. 4 Furthermore, lower environmental standards in other countries
provide the United States with a greater incentive to do its part. 75 The
government must utilize NEPA to its fullest extent.
Among the policy aspects that are a cause for concern when deter-
mining extraterritorial application of NEPA is the sovereignty of foreign
countries. "The agencies and the courts fear, perhaps most of all, that
requiring NEPA compliance for actions in foreign countries would be an
infringement upon the sovereignty of foreign governments." '76 Some
argue that the EIS process may impede technological advancement in
other countries, particularly in developing countries."" However, envi-
ronmental problems are especially acute in lesser developed countries
which makes environmental protection and control of the U.S. environ-
mental impact all the more pertinent.' Moreover, NEPA applies only
to U.S. actions by U.S. agencies and does not affect the substantive
laws of any country.'
7 Emsdorff, supra note 14, at 133.
7 For a review of other methods, see, e.g., Whitney, supra note 14, at 453-63 (discussing
the Agency for International Development (AID) and Multinational Development Banks (MDBs)).
"' Spracker & Naftalin, supra note 7, at 1043 ("Dissatisfied with both the pace and substan-
tive content of these regulatory efforts [in Europe and elsewhere], some environmental groups
have attempted to extend judicially the application of U.S. environmental standards to ventures in
other countries.").
176 Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 567. See also id. at 595-99 (proposing a balancing approach).
'" "A typical developing nation's economy could depend on offering resources and land to
industrialized nations. Such nations may resist the environmental impact assessment process
because they believe restricting environmentally unsafe technology would impede their progress."
Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 587.
On the other hand, some industrialized nations seem willing to help developing countries
whose economies may be harmed by efforts to protect the environment. See, e.g., Hague Decla-
ration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1308 (1989) (signed by
twenty-four states, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
India, Japan, Kenya, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). "The international community and especially the
industrialized nations have special obligations to assist developing countries which will be very
negatively affected by changes in the atmosphere [ozone layer deterioration] although the respon-
sibility of many of them for the process may only be marginal today." Id. at 1309.
178 Vice President Gore states that many of the programs for Third World countries have
been catastrophic because the environment was ignored in efforts to jump-start the industrial sec-
tor. Industrialized countries must understand that the Third World has no choice but to develop
economically; however, they must do so in an environmentally sensitive manner so as not to
worsen the problems of poverty, hunger, and disease. GoRE, supra note 4, at 279-80.
17 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. National Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("NEPA is designed to control
the decisionmaking process of U.S. federal agencies, not the substance of agency decisions ....
Because the decisionmaking processes of federal agencies take place almost exclusively in this
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Other arguments against the extraterritorial application of NEPA
include concerns that it would result in practical difficulties for federal
agencies operating abroad, interfere with the implementation of U.S.
foreign policy, hinder confidential negotiations, and cause delay. 8 In
response to these concerns, NEPA provides enough flexibility to accom-
modate such needs.' 8' For example, there is an exemption available for
military activities in times of war.' It is not mandatory that confiden-
tial information be disclosed in environmental impact statements; howev-
er, even if such information is disclosed, it is not necessarily available
for release to the public.'83 In regard to the delay caused by EIS' be-
cause of the necessity for public comment, the CEQ has authority to
make alternative arrangements in certain circumstances. 8" "NEPA, un-
like many environmental statutes, does not dictate agency policy or
determine the fate of contemplated action .... After weighing environ-
mental considerations, an agency decisionmaker remains free to subordi-
nate the environmental concerns revealed in the EIS to other policy con-
cerns."'85 The best way to protect the environment is to require all
agencies to fully comply with the EIS mandate allowing an adequate
amount of time for public comment, but, at the same time, recognizing
the need for a certain degree of flexibility in the process.
In summary, the NEPA process works to ensure that environmental
considerations are taken into account in every federal agency decision.
Such consideration is desirable because it helps the United States do its
part in the prevention of environmental degradation. The courts must
country and involve the workings of the United States government, they are uniquely domestic.")
'8o Note, supra note 14, at 373.
I d. at 378,
1 See supra note 48.
183 Note, supra note 14, at 374.
'u See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1992).
' Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National Science Found., 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
It has been argued that the entire "congressional intent" test is wrong:
[Tihe extraterritorial application of NEPA would not transgress accepted prin-
ciples of international law since the imposition of its procedures on federal
agencies abroad would not infringe on either foreign sovereignty or the
rights of foreign nationals. Thus, a court should not require a "clear indica-
tion" of legislative intent in order to apply the Act to the extraterritorial
activities of federal agencies. Rather . . . a court should consider all the
relevant manifestations of congressional intent to determine "whether, if
Congress had thought about the point, it would have wished to" extend the
scope of NEPA's procedural mandate.
Note, supra note 14, at 357-58 (The author then concludes that Congress would have wanted
NEPA to apply extraterritorially.).
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recognize the importance of this goal by eliminating senseless distinc-
tions among statutes and recognize the stated purpose of NEPA to pro-
tect the global environment.
VI. PROPOSAL
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. National Science Founda-
tion,'86 the D.C. Circuit Court took a positive step in the application of
NEPA to a federal action in Antarctica, but this decision fell short of
the ideal resolution of the issue. The courts must recognize that the
global commons encompass the entire globe and are not limited to pris-
tine areas without a sovereign such as Antarctica. By following the
example of the D.C. Circuit and eliminating the consideration of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in NEPA cases, the courts could
achieve the national environmental policy of global environmental pro-
tection.
In the alternative, the courts could achieve this clearly desirable
goal by abolishing the senseless market/nonmarket distinctions they have
established in the interpretation of U.S. statutes. One method that the
courts could utilize is a blanket market test: for example, if the regulat-
ed conduct occurs within the United States (e.g. federal agency
decisionmaking for NEPA), the statute should apply.'87 This method
would restore legal integrity to the judicial process of statutory interpre-
tation.
A final method that could be implemented to achieve the extraterri-
torial application of NEPA is a congressional amendment. What is need-
ed is the insertion of a statement proclaiming that NEPA is meant to
apply to federal actions outside the United States.' The statutory
amendment process aside, this method of reform may be the easiest
because it would call for little judicial interpretation and no piecemeal
judicial revision of precedents. The problem of whether or not to infer
congressional intent from the statutory language would be alleviated, but
the market/nonmarket distinctions in statutory interpretations would be
left substantially intact. Therefore, the best way to achieve the extra-
territorial application of NEPA, and the elimination of the governmental
.. 986 F.2d 528.
'" This is the "conduct test" discussed supra part V.A.
188 For example, in § 4321 after the statement of purpose or at the end of § 4332, a provi-
sion could be added that states: "This Act applies to all federal actions regardless of their oc-
currence within or outside of the territorial boundaries of the United States." The amendment to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, extending the application of Title VII to American employees of
United States companies abroad, is an excellent precedent for the analogous amendment to
NEPA.
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hypocrisy evident in market/nonmarket distinctions, is through the estab-
lishment of a market test for all statutes, as well as a congressional
amendment to NEPA, definitively declaring its reach to encompass all
federal actions regardless of where they occur.
"Congress did not engage in lengthy debate when it drafted and
enacted NEPA. The legislature therefore was not fully aware of the im-
plications of the statute." '189 Now is the time for Congress to recognize
not only the dominion of NEPA, but also that the protection of the
environment is imperative. "[I]f we do not lead the world on this issue,
the chances of accomplishing the massive changes necessary to save the
global environment will be negligible. If the United States does choose
to lead, however, the possibility of success becomes much greater."'90
The extraterritorial application of NEPA is one way for the United
States to take responsibility for the impact of its actions abroad, as well
as at home, and to be a leader in the attainment of global environmental
protection.
's Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 556.
190 GORE, supra note 4, at 177.
Other methods of global environmental protection, especially international cooperation, are
available but have yet to be proven entirely effective. See, e.g., Whitney, supra note 14, at 461-
62 (The United States participates in Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) which provide aid
to Third World countries. In the course of its participation in these activities, the U.S. has tried
to use diplomatic pressure upon the MDBs and donor nations to incorporate environmental
analyses into their decisionmaking; however, because the U.S. is only one of several nations that
take part in the MDBs' activities, its recommendations hold no particular force and, therefore, are
not always considered.); Ernsdorff, supra note 14, at 133-34 (The Agency for International
Development (AID) has adopted environmental assessment procedures for the projects it supports
around the world, but some believe that these procedures are not stringent enough.).
Among recent attempts at international environmental protection was the June, 1992, United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (The Earth Summit) held in Rio de
Janeiro. See 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992). However, commentators have noted the "inept performance by
the Bush Administration . . . " at the conference. Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, After
Rio, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1992, at 3,3. The United States refused to sign the Convention on
Biological Diversity, one of the two conventions resulting from the conference, and failed to
assume the leadership position that many assumed it would. See id. at 3; Jacob D. Werksam,
Undermining the Summit: The United States Ignores International Environmental Law at Its Peril,
L.A. Daily J., June 10, 1992, at 6,6.
